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TWO SECTION TWOS AND TWO SECTION FIVES: VOTING
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES AFTER FLORES
PAMELA S. KARLAN"

My favorite book review of all time appeared in Field and
Stream and concerned Lady Chatterley'sLover:
[This fictional account of the day-by-day life of an English
gamekeeper is still of considerable interest to out-door-minded
readers, as it contains many passages on pheasant raising,
the apprehending of poachers, ways to control vermin, and
other chores and duties of the professional gamekeeper. Unfortunately, one is obliged to wade through many pages of
extraneous material in order to discover and savor these sidelights on the management of a Midlands shooting estate .... '
I suppose I should feel apologetic, but my reaction to City of
Boerne v. Flores2 was rather similar. I know most constitutional
scholars consider the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)3 and the religion clauses the far sexier topic, but what
gripped me was the Court's treatment of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (the "Act").4
With respect to the Voting Rights Act, Flores was remarkable
for its blend of enthusiasm and silence. Justice Kennedy's opinion relied heavily on the Act as an exemplary illustration of
congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Yet the quartet of "[r]ecent" Voting Rights

* Professor of Law and Roy L. and Rosamond Woodruff Morgan Research Professor, University of Virginia. My colleagues John Harrison and Dan Ortiz helped
me to think through some of the issues discussed in this piece.
1. The review, which originally appeared in 1959, is reprinted in Best of the
Best: Column Excerpts, FIELD & STREAM, Oct. 1995, at 10, 148.
2. 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973p (1994).
5. Actually, most of the cases Justice Kennedy cited relied on Congress's use of
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Act cases on which he relied were all decided at least seventeen
years ago.' In more contemporary cases involving the key provision of the 1982 amendments to the Act, Justice Kennedy has
explicitly left open the question of the Act's constitutionality.7
My goal in this Essay is to begin to answer that question and
show that the Voting Rights Act, in its current form, remains a
proper use of congressional enforcement power. Congress's
choice of disparate impact tests in both section 2 and section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act represents an appropriate congressional
judgment despite the Supreme Court's decisions in City of Mobile v. Bolden' and Rogers v. Lodge9 that only purposeful vote
dilution violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. ° Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are
designed to address prior unconstitutional discrimination, both
within and outside the electoral process, as well as to prevent
future invidious conduct. Moreover, each is carefully calibrated
to insure "congruence and proportionality between the injur[ies]
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.""

its enforcement power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See, e.g., City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 216 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 231-36
(Brennan, White, & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
282-84 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J.
& Blackmun, J.); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324-27 (1966). But
because the two amendments are rough contemporaries and their enforcement power
provisions are articulated in similar terms, the analysis surely carries over.
6. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166. In addition to the cases cited in the previous
note, which were all decided by 1980, the Court also relied on Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
7. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1028-29 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
8. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
9. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
10. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 69-70; Lodge, 458 U.S. at 617.
11. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
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I. THE VOTING RIGHTS QUARTET: THE REACH OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER SECTIONS 2 AND 5 OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment grant Congress the "power to enforce" the
amendments' substantive commands by "appropriate legislation."' The question at the heart of Fores was Congress's power to forbid state practices that have only a disparate impact in
the service of enforcing constitutional provisions that would
directly forbid only purposeful discrimination. In answering this
question, the Court quite naturally turned to the quartet of
Voting Rights Act precedents because they offer the most complete explanation of congressional enforcement power under the
Reconstruction Amendments.
Fores discussed provisions of the Voting Rights Act that
banned the use of literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting and
that imposed a "preclearance" requirement on certain jurisdictions with a history of depressed political participation, requiring them to obtain federal approval before implementing changes in any laws affecting voting."3 Flores reaffirmed the propriety of these provisions as responses to "the widespread and
persisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this

12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); id. amend. XV, § 2
("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
13. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1965), involved, for present purposes, a challenge to the Voting Rights Act's five-year suspension of literacy tests in
a targeted set of states and counties with a history of depressed political participation, section 4(b), and its concomitant requirement that these "covered jurisdictions"
seek preclearance, section 5. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), involved a
challenge to section 4(e) of the 1965 Act, which essentially relieved Puerto Ricaflos
who had received their education in Spanish-speaking schools from having to pass
any still surviving literacy tests. The other two decisions discussed in Flores-Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156
(1980)-challenged aspects of the Act as it was subsequently amended. Part of the
complaint in Mitchell challenged Congress's then-temporary decision to ban literacy
tests nationwide (a ban that was made permanent in 1975, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa
(1994)), and City of Rome concerned Congress's 1975 decision to extend the
preclearance requirement of section 5 for another seven years. In 1982, Congress extended the preclearance requirement until 2007. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (1994).

728

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:725

country's history of racial discrimination."'4
The cases on which the Court relied offer three models of
congressionally corrigible invidious discrimination: the internal,
the external, and the prospective. The operation of these models,
and the types of congressional responses they might permit, are
illustrated by the literacy test cases.
First, under the internal model, literacy tests themselves
might be the source of invidious discrimination; that is, the
unconstitutional discrimination might "occur within the electoral
system. Congress and the Court had substantial evidence that
literacy tests were administered in deliberately discriminatory
ways for the purpose of excluding black citizens who possessed
the same abilities as white individuals who were permitted to
register. 5 Under this view, Congress could ban literacy tests
because the available evidence gave it "reason to believe that
many of the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional." 6 The congressional ban might-and in fact did'--reach some literacy tests
that could not be proven to be purposefully discriminatory. But
as long as there was "congruence and proportionality between
the [unconstitutional] injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end,""8 the Constitution does not
require a perfect fit.
Second, in the external model, purposeful governmental discrimination outside the electoral system might play out within
the electoral system, where it would be observed in the disparate impact of otherwise acceptable policies. For example, the
inability of minority voters to pass even a fairly administered

14. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167.
15. The Court provides a catalog of examples in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. at 312.
16. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
17. One of the literacy tests that was suspended by section 4(a), 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(a) (1994), was employed by Northampton County, North Carolina, see 28
C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (1994) (listing Northampton County as a covered jurisdiction as of
Nov. 1, 1964). In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,
53 (1959), the Supreme Court had upheld Northampton County's use of a literacy
test, noting that there were no allegations that the test was discriminatory on its
face or as applied.
18. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
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literacy test might be "the direct consequence of previous governmental discrimination in education." 9 Under this view, Congress could ban literacy tests to reach and remedy the effects of
that impermissible prior discrimination. Again, even though
some of the beneficiaries of the ban on literacy tests might not
be actual victims of the government's unconstitutional provision
of an inferior and inadequate education, there was a sufficient
connection to justify some level of overbreadth.
Third, under the prospective model, literacy tests might be
seen as enabling future invidious action. For example, if literacy
tests eliminate a disproportionate number of minority citizens
from the electorate, then their diminished voting power might
leave minorities vulnerable to discrimination in a wide range of
government programs by officials who would be relieved of any
practical need to be responsive to the minority's concerns. Under
this expansive view, Congress might ban literacy tests "as a
remedial measure to deal with... discrimination in the provision of public services." 0 In short, there are a variety of ways
in which "[1]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement
power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not
itself unconstitutional."2 '
Flores's discussion of the Voting Rights Act quartet also sheds
light on the requisite "congruence and proportionality" between
means and ends under the enforcement powers.2 2 The provisions
at issue in the quartet were simultaneously quite broad and quite
narrowly targeted. But the Court saw both the Act's breadth and
its narrowness as reflecting appropriate congressional judgment.
Preclearance, for example, is an "uncommon"' and "extraordi-

19. Id. at 2167 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 235 (1970) (Brennan,
White, & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Gaston
County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291 (1969) (rejecting Gaston County's request
for an exemption from suspension and coverage on the grounds that, regardless of
whether the county had administered its literacy test impartially, its maintenance of

a de jure segregated school system that provided black citizens with an inferior education
20.
21.
22.
23.

"in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test").
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
Id at 2163.
Id. at 2164.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
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nary departure" from the usual relationship between the federal
government and the states,' but it reaches only a limited number of jurisdictions where Congress had reason to believe past
discrimination was pervasive and future discrimination was
likely.' And its coverage has always been only temporary: the
version upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach was scheduled
to terminate within five years;26 the 1975 amendment approved
in City of Rome "lapsed in seven years."27 Similarly, although
by the time of Oregon v. Mitchell' Congress had banned literacy tests nationwide, it addressed only a specific practice "with
a long history as a 'notorious means to deny and abridge voting
rights on racial grounds."29
Beneath the surface, the Court's analysis of the requirement
of means-ends tailoring poses a tantalizing question: Must the
prospect of purposeful discrimination be a continuing threat?
That is, can an "enforcement" statute become unconstitutional if
circumstances change? Justice Kennedy seemed to disclaim any
requirement that Congress ensure that the legislation survives
only as long as the danger of unconstitutional state action persists. 0 Still, his discussion of RFRA's legislative record at least
raises the possibility of some kind of durational constraint. Justice Kennedy observed that the record "lacks examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this country detailed in the hearing mentions no episodes occurring in the past
forty years."" The contrast between present circumstances and
a history of discrimination suggests that there might have been
a moment when Congress might have identified a level of persecution sufficient to justify some form of a Religious Freedom
Act-perhaps one more closely targeted at particular jurisdic24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
at 355

Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S 491, 500 (1992).
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335.
See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
Id.
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
(Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

30. See id. ("This is not to say, of course, that § 5 legislation requires termination dates. .. ").
31. Id. at 2169.
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tions or practices-even if that moment has now passed. But if
the record today is inadequate to justify the exercise of congressional enforcement power, why does a previous exercise remain
appropriate?32 There is something at least disquieting about the
idea of continuing federal intervention if the grounds on which
congressional action rest "have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past."3
At the same time, it may be quite difficult to judge whether a
threat has receded because state actors no longer wish to engage
in purposeful discrimination (if,for example, attitudes about the
protected class or behavior have changed) or only because the
congressional prohibition remains in place. Congressional decisions about whether to impose an express durational limit in the
first place or whether to revisit prior enforcement statutes
should therefore be accorded a fair degree of deference.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS Two-STEP: THE EXERCISE OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER SECTIONS 2 AND 5 OF THE

VOTING RIGHTS ACT
The discussion of the Voting Rights Act precedents in Flores
thus sets out a roadmap for assessing the constitutionality of the
Act in its current incarnation. The two key provisions of the
modern Voting Rights Act are section 2's "results" test and section 5's "retrogression" standard.' Section 2 was amended in
32. Consider, for example, the policies upheld in Korematsu u. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (involving the internment of persons of Japanese descent who lived
on the West Coast), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (involving
a West Coast curfew against persons of Japanese ancestry). Although the Court
found these measures acceptable in light of military imperatives, it seems inconceivable that the federal government could have continued the internment and curfew
once World War II ended and the (at best) perceived threat of sabotage had disappeared. Similarly, although a state might be entitled temporarily to segregate prison
inmates on the basis of race to quell a prison riot, see Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333, 334 (1968) (Black, J., concurring), it certainly could not continue that segregation after the emergency had passed.
33. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
34. Both sections 2 and 5 also reach purposeful discrimination, but here the only
significant departure from the constitutional standards under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments seems to be that section 5 places the burden of disproving
the presence of a discriminatory purpose on the covered jurisdiction, rather than
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1982 as a response to the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Mobile v. Bolden 5 that both the prior version of section 2 and
the Fourteenth Amendment forbade only purposeful vote dilution. 6 Section 2 provides that no voting practice or procedure
"shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color, or [membership in a specified language minority
group]." 7 The forbidden result occurs when,
[biased on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that
the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a)... in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.38
Plaintiffs in a section 2 lawsuit therefore are not required to
show that the state either enacted or maintained the challenged
practice because of its discriminatory impact on minority voting
strength.
The current version of section 5 continues the preclearance
regime upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach"9 and City of
Rome v. United States." It'provides that before a covered jurisdiction "shall enact or seek to administer any.., procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect" on the date
it became a covered jurisdiction, it must show that the procedure
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying

placing the burden of proving an invidious motive on the plaintiff challenging a proposed change. Nothing in the Court's equal protection or enforcement jurisprudence
casts any doubt on congressional power to structure the allocation of proof within
lawsuits.
35. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
36. See id. at 60-61, 69-70.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
38. Id. § 1973(b).
39. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
40. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees [protecting language minorities]."" The Court has interpreted the "effects" prong of section 5
to embody a "retrogression" test: changes that either enhance or
leave unchanged a minority group's political position do not violate section 5 "unless the new [policy] itself so discriminates on
the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution."42
Both sections 2 and 5 can be seen as appropriate enforcement
measures under the internal, external, and prospective approaches. Moreover, each contains a kind of durational calibration that makes the enforcement congruent with the injury.
A. The InternalPerspective
The record before Congress in 1982 revealed numerous "modern instances of generally applicable [election] laws passed because of [racial] bigotry."" As the Senate Report accompanying
the 1982 amendments explained, the very passage of the 1965
Act seems to have prompted a new wave of purposeful discrimination within the electoral system: "a broad array of dilution
schemes were employed to cancel the impact of the new black
vote."" Of particular salience to the question whether the Act's
treatment of racial vote dilution represents appropriate congressional action, "election boundaries were gerrymandered" and "atlarge elections were substituted for election by single-member
districts, or combined with other sophisticated rules to prevent
an effective minority vote." 5 Extensive hearings and the record
of preclearance objections during the period from 1975 to 1980
showed repeated problems with apparently purposeful racial

41. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act offers two routes for

satisfying this standard. First, a covered jurisdiction may obtain a declaratory
judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Second,
the jurisdiction may "submit" the change to the Attorney General and receive administrative preclearance. In the latter case, the jurisdiction may implement the change
unless the Attorney General has "interposed an objection within sixty days." Id.
42. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
43. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997) (explaining that
although such modem instances were present in the records on racial issues, they
were lacking in the record on religion issues).
44. S.REP. No. 97-417, at 6 (1982).
45. Id.
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vote dilution.46
The round of reapportionment that was underway while Congress was amending and extending sections 2 and 5 confirms
that Congress was right to discern a substantial likelihood of
continuing internal discrimination. In Busbee v. Smith,47 for
example, the District of Columbia District Court refused to
preclear Georgia's 1981 congressional apportionment, which
failed to draw a majority-black district in the heavily black Atlanta metropolitan region. The court's analysis relied in part on
a statement by the Chairman of the Georgia House Reapportionment Committee, Joe Mack Wilson, that "I don't want to draw
nigger districts"48 and a finding that Georgia House Speaker
Thomas Murphy had "racial attitudes" that led him to "purposefully discriminat[e]" throughout the 1981 redistricting process.49
Similarly, in Major v. Treen, ° a district court concluded that
Louisiana's 1981 congressional reapportionment violated section
2. In addition to pointing out the highly irregular manner in
which the plan split a large, geographically compact and politically cohesive black community in the New Orleans area, the
court noted discrimination in the redistricting process: during
the last round of legislative negotiations, black state legislators
were "deliberately excluded from the final decision-making process"; ' in fact, they literally were kept out of the room where
the deal was made. The Attorney General denied preclearance to
North Carolina's 1981 congressional redistricting and Petersburg, Virginia's 1981 councilmanic redistricting on the grounds
that each appeared to have a discriminatory purpose.52 This
modern discrimination was not solely a regional problem. In
Garza v. Los Angeles Board of Supervisors," the district court
found a deliberate "intent to maintain fragmentation of the
46. See id. at 10-12.
47. 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge court), affd, 459 U.S. 1166
(1983).

48. Id. at 501.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 510.
574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge court).
Id. at 352.
See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 177,

188.
53. 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal.), affd, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Hispanic vote"' in the way Los Angeles drew its 1981 supervisory districts. Also, in Rybicki v. State Board of Elections,55 the
court found that the post-1980 Illinois state legislative reapportionment unconstitutionally diluted black voting strength in the
Chicago area.
Such experiences also suggest pragmatic reasons for not requiring judicial findings of discriminatory purpose. As the Senate Report explained, requiring courts to label "individual officials or entire communities" as racist in order to grant judicial
relief was tremendously "divisive, threatening to destroy any
existing racial progress in a community."56 Requiring proof of
purpose, therefore, might exacerbate purposeful discrimination.
And the district court's decision in Major v. Treen57 suggests an
additional danger: after providing page after page of examples of
overt and covert discrimination in the Louisiana reapportionment process, the court was unwilling to "draw the ultimate
inference of purposeful discrimination.""8 Judges, after all, often
live in the same milieu as other public officials and far away
from the plaintiffs who bring racial vote dilution lawsuits. If
they are compelled to call their acquaintances evil in order to do
justice, then they may find themselves tempted to shade their
judgment in even remotely close cases. Congress realistically
might have concluded that forcing a specific finding of racist
intent would immunize intentionally discriminatory systems.
A different set of pragmatic concerns arises with respect to
long-standing practices. Here, too congressional enforcement
may properly sweep more broadly than simply restating the
Constitution's "self-executing"59 ban on intentional discrimination. This point was driven home by the ultimate decision in
Bolden v. City of Mobile.60 After the case was remanded to the
54. Id. at 1305; see id. at 1312, 1317-18 (discussing evidence of a discriminatory
purpose).
55. 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1106-10 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (three-judge court).
56. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214 (quoting
the testimony of Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights).
57. 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge court).
58. Id. at 355 n.45.
59. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966).
60. 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
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district court, the plaintiffs hired three historians to trace the
history of Mobile's election system. Based on the evidence they
uncovered after months of archival work, the district court ultimately issued a lengthy opinion tracing the tortuous history of
Mobile's electoral practices from 1867 until 1911, when the existing election system was adopted."' The district court found
that discriminatory motivations permeated the system at virtually every turn.62 The court also found that, in the 1960s, the
city decided to retain the existing system because a switch to
district-based elections, like any other change that might "increase black representation[,] just would not fly.... There was
certainly an intent to maintain the at-large election system for
racial motives."63 The cost of proving what turned out to be a
blatant series of constitutional violations was staggering: The
black plaintiffs' lawyers logged 5,525 hours and spent $96,000 in
out-of-pocket expenses, "which were exclusive of expenses incurred by Justice Department lawyers after the department
intervened [in support of the plaintiffs] and the costs of expert
witnesses and paralegals."' Given the minuscule size of the
voting rights bar, requiring plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination in cases involving complex election practices with
lengthy and distant pedigrees would quite plausibly leave literally thousands of unconstitutional systems in place. The burdens
of proving discriminatory purpose in a vote dilution case were
thus on par with the burdens to which the Supreme Court pointed in South Carolinav. Katzenbach" in explaining the need for
vigorous congressional enforcement.
More generally, there is a problem in the determination of
discriminatory purpose unique to the sphere of voting rights. As
my colleague Dan Ortiz has explained, the "intent doctrine" in

61. See id.
62. See id. at 1056-68, 1074-77.
63. Id. at 1068.
64. Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF
THE VOTING RIGHTs ACT, 1965-1990, at 21, 29 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofinan eds., 1994).
65. 383 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1966) (noting, among other things, that a voting suit
might take 6,000 hours of attorney time to successfully challenge literacy tests in a
single county).
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voting cases bears only a scant relationship to the actual motivation of any particular government actor.66 In Rogers v. Lodge,"
for example, the Court found that "the at-large system in Burke
County [Georgia] was being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population."68
In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed to a sprawling
array of facts. Some involved the history of prior purposeful
discrimination in Burke County. Some involved the present-day
unresponsiveness of public officials. Others involved the county's
demography and geography and various features of its electoral
system.69 The Court left unstated the link between these facts
on the one hand, and a deliberate decision by state actors to
maintain at-large elections in order to perpetuate black political
powerlessness on the other hand. Even more significantly, as
Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court "never identified or mentioned" precisely who had "harbored an improper intent.""
In fact, the most likely culprits were the present-day white
voters of Burke County: they were a majority of the electorate,
and their refusal to support candidates who represented the
political interests of the black community shut out black-sponsored candidates. "The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and
historical conditions,"7 such as racial bloc voting,72 "to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives."7 3 But the white
voters whose discriminatory sentiments are the operative engine
by which black voters are politically excluded, are not, of course,
state actors. 74 In any event, their choices were constitutionally
protected even if they were based on outright racism.6 Still,
66. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1126 (1989).
67. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
68. Id. at 622.
69. See id. at 625-27.
70. Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 629 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(making the same point).
71. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
72. An issue to which I return in the next section. See discussion infra Part II. B.
73. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
74. See Lodge, 458 U.S. at 647 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL.
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the state was operating a forum that enabled white voters to
engage in racial discrimination.
In light of the apparent convergence of effects and intent
standards and the "distinctive blend of state action and private
choice involved in the electoral process, " 7' even ifthe state's
"purpose"--to the extent it can be said really to have one-does
not rise to the level of an outright desire to injure minorities, it
is certainly morally culpable.7 7 In assessing the constitutionality of Congress's determination to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments using an impact standard, the Court
should conclude that the risk that constitutionally innocuous
conduct will be banned is outweighed by the difficulty of detecting and stopping serious constitutional injuries.
B. The External and Prospective Perspectives
To understand why sections 2 and 5 are also appropriate
responses under the external and prospective models requires a
brief detour into one of the key concepts of contemporary voting
rights law: racial bloc voting. Racial bloc voting, also called racially polarized voting, "exists where there is a consistent relationship between the race of the voter and the way in which [a]
voter votes, or to put it differently, where black voters and white
voters vote differently." 71 When voting is racially polarized, "the
black minority usually votes for one candidate, and the white
majority votes for and elects a different candidate."79 But the
effects of racial bloc voting extend beyond the mere defeat of the
black community's candidates of choice. "Not only does voting
along racial lines deprive minority voters of their preferred representatives in these circumstances, it also allows those elected
to ignore minority interests without fear of political consequences, leaving the minority effectively unrepresented."0
L. REv. 1201, 1228 (1996) (explaining that voting decisions are protected under the
First Amendment).
76. Id. at 1227.
77. See Pamela S. Karlan, Note, DiscriminatoryPurpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 124-25 (1983).
78. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
1987), affd,
79. McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (C.D. Ill.
851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988).
80. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.14 (internal quotation marks and citations

1998]

VOTING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES AFTER FLORES

739

Racial bloc voting that results in the defeat of minority-preferred candidates and the disregard of minority interests surely
is caused in part by external government discrimination. "To the
extent that racially correlated differences in political preferences
are the product of socioeconomic disparities produced by inferior
access to schools, government services, and the like, state action
has caused polarized voting."8 ' The district court in Thornburg
v. Gingles recognized this in concluding that "historic discrimination" resulted in blacks in North Carolina having a lower
socioeconomic status than whites: this disparity in status "gives
rise to special group interests and hinders blacks' ability to participate effectively in the political process."82 Even beyond the
material reasons why past discrimination might cause differences in voting behavior, there may be an attitudinal effect too. The
broad range of purposeful past governmental discrimination "is
likely to have affected white voters' attitudes by communicating
the idea that black voters' attempts to gain political power
should be resisted."83
Voting rights remedies that dismantle multimember districts
or at-large election systems and that create some majority-black
constituencies dampen the present effects of this past external
discrimination. Smaller constituencies, for example, may enable
candidates with less funding to compete more effectively; to the
extent that the depressed socioeconomic status of minority communities is a product of prior unconstitutional discrimination-as it surely is-single-member districts offer a partial
remedy. Differences in white and black voter's attitudes can be
attributed at least in part to past invidious state action. This
action may play out either in different material interests or in a

omitted); see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982) (making the same point in
the course of striking down a Georgia county's use of at-large elections as purposefully discriminatory). For an excellent discussion of the interaction between racial
bloc voting and process failure generally, see Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting
and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90
MICH. L. REv. 1833, 1865-71 (1992).
81. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 75, at 1229.
82. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 39 (describing the district court's analysis). This finding
picked up on the analysis in S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
83. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 75, at 1229.
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refusal to support candidates sponsored by voters of the other
race simply because of racial tribalism. Majority-black constituencies, however, allow black voters to circumvent the obstacle
posed by racial bloc voting: as the electoral majority in some
districts, they can elect some of the candidates of their choice.
As for the prospective model, the process failure caused by
racial bloc voting plays out in post-election nonresponsiveness to
the needs of the black community." As one court explained,
"[i]n a very real sense,... racially polarized voting perpetuates
the effects of past discrimination."8 5 If the right to vote is "preservative of all rights,"8 6 then the right to an undiluted, equally
effective vote is surely preservative of equal access to other
rights and governmental services. Sections 2 and 5 are designed,
therefore, to accomplish nationwide what section 4(e) was intended to accomplish for Puerto Ricafios in New York: "nondiscriminatory treatment by government-both in the imposition of
voting qualifications and the provision or administration of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and
law enforcement." 7 Given our long history of inequality in
these areas, and the connection between minority political
powerlessness and this inequality, Congress might reasonably
conclude that such inequality is better combatted on the wholesale level, by providing all citizens with an equal opportunity "to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice,"' than on only the retail level, by laws that impose equal treatment obligations in discrete areas of state government activity such as schools, public employment, or housing.
C. The DurationalModesty of the Voting Rights Act
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act's preclearance regime remains
temporary, scheduled to lapse in the year 2007 unless Congress
concludes that it is still necessary. Assuming that Congress does

84. See Issacharoff, supra note 80, at 1865-71.
85. Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1463 (M.D. Ala.
1988); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.14.
86. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
87. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
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extend section 5s lifespan once again, the analysis I set out above
would enable the courts to determine whether it remains-as it did
at the time of South Carolinav. Katzenbach and City ofRome-an
appropriate use of congressional enforcement power given the
nature of the threat of future invidious discrimination.
Section 2, by contrast, contains no sunset provision. Nor does
it cover only specific jurisdictions with a well-documented history of unconstitutional conduct. Nonetheless, the genius of the
requirement that plaintiffs in section 2 vote dilution suits prove
racial bloc voting is that that requirement provides precisely
such a durational limit on section 2's operation. Election practices are vulnerable to section 2 only if a jurisdiction's politics is
characterized by racial polarization. As the lingering effects of
racial discrimination abate, and thus as excluded minorities
become physically and politically integrated into the dominant
society, their ability and need to bring claims under section 2
will subside as well. When the history of racial discrimination in
our political process "mentions no episodes occurring in the past
40 years,"8 9 there will not be any more section 2 cases or any
need for section 2. But just as Field and Stream thought that
Lady Chatterley's Lover "cannot take the place of J.R. Miller's
PracticalGamekeeping,"0 I think that the romantic "dream of a
Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to
personal opportunity"9 ' is not yet enough of a reality to take
the place of the Voting Rights Act's "searching practical evaluation"92 of the games politicians play.
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